Better educated countries have better governments, an empirical regularity that holds in both dictatorships and democracies. A possible reason for this fact is that educated people are more likely to complain about misconduct by government officials and that more frequent complaints encourage better behavior from officials. Newly assembled individual-level survey data from the World Justice Project show that, within countries, better educated people are more likely to report official misconduct. The results are confirmed using other survey data on reporting crime and corruption. Citizen complaints might thus be an operative mechanism that explains the link between education and the quality of government.
I. Introduction
By just about any measure, the quality of government is higher in richer and more educated countries. Such countries tend to be more democratic, politically freer, more respectful of property rights, less corrupt, and more efficient in the provision of public services such as infrastructure and regulation (see, e.g., La Porta et al. 1999 , Barro 1999 , Treisman 2000 , Svensson 2005 . Figure 1 illustrates some well-known correlations between education and the quality of government. The positive correlation between education (or per capita income) and the quality of government holds in both dictatorships and democracies ( Figure 2 ). It also holds in countries with different legal traditions, ethnic heterogeneity, and inequality (La Porta et al. 1999 ). Most studies find that education and development lead to improved government (e.g., Barro 1999 , Glaeser et al. 2004 , Bobba and Coviello 2007 , Castello-Climent 2008 , Murtin and Wacziarg 2011 , although some disagree (Acemoglu et al. 2005) . In this paper, we ask why the quality of government improves with education and development, assuming that it does.
The most common explanation of the improvement in the quality of government in the process of development is accountability. Perhaps the central mechanism of such accountability, going back at least to Hirschman's (1970) idea of voice, is voting. If voters punish incompetent or corrupt politicians, and if education promotes political participation and voting, then increases in education lead to improvements in the quality of government. Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) are among the first prominent studies in political science linking education to political participation. These studies consider both voting and other forms of participation, such as volunteering. Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulus (2004) provide evidence of causal links between education and voting.
Voting is surely important, but the fact that the quality of government improves with education in dictatorships as well as in democracies is an indication that voting is not the only mechanism linking the two. In fact, recent research has broadened the notions of political accountability, and focused on the roles of audits, the media, disclosure by politicians, political checks-and-balances, and even uprisings, in monitoring government misconduct. Some of the growing number of studies in this area include Reinikka and Svensson (2004, 2005) , Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007) , Olken (2007) , Pandey et al. (2007) , Ferraz and Finan (2008, 2011) , Djankov et al. (2010) , Pande (2011), and Ferraz, Finan and Moreira (2012) .
In this paper, we propose a complementary mechanism of accountability. In our view, one reason why government improves is that citizens complain against public officials who mistreat them: policemen who beat them up, officials who demand bribes, teachers who do not show up. All countries have some laws against police abuse, corruption, and public employee absenteeism, which include penalties for official misconduct. A public official choosing to break rules must trade off the risk of being disciplined, no matter how small for each individual complaint, against the benefits of misconduct. As citizen complaints proliferate, the risk of an investigation and disciplinary action rises. We propose that educated people are more likely to complain against official misconduct (and perhaps to complain more effectively). As education levels in a country rise, so do complaints when officials misbehave, raising the expected costs of misconduct and thus encouraging better behavior -to ask for fewer bribes, to avoid abusing people, to show up to work. Through this entirely decentralized process, only roughly dependent on the prevailing political arrangements such as democracy or dictatorship, the quality of government improves. In our working paper (Botero et al. 2012 ), we present a simple model illustrating this mechanism.
We present evidence bearing on three hypotheses derived from this view of complaints and accountability: (1) educated people complain more, (2) citizens complain more in countries with a higher probability of action being taken against a misbehaving official, and (3) better educated countries have a lower incidence of public misconduct. Our main data source is a series of surveys of the general population carried out by the World Justice Project in 97 countries between 2009 and 2012 (Agrast et al. 2012 . These surveys cover the experiences and perceptions of people in their dealings with the government, the police, the courts, as well as with crime and victimization. The data also contain information about the demographic characteristics of the respondents, including their education.
The principal questions from the WJP surveys we examine deal with official misconduct and whether it was reported by the victim. There are two main questions in the surveys; the first asks whether respondents have complained about some aspect of government services in general during the previous year. The second question asks whether respondents experienced police abuse, and if so, whether they reported it. In addition, the WJP surveys contain information about respondents reporting crime, specifically break-ins and armed robberies.
2 Although these questions do not pertain to complaints about public misconduct per se, they do give us information about the propensity to report problems to the government, and thus shed light on the relationship between education and voice. Finally, WJP asks respondents to assess whether policemen who violate the law will be punished, and we use these data as a proxy for the expected likelihood of the success of a complaint.
To further check the robustness of our results, we supplement WJP data with some questions from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), which contains information 2 The relationship between education and crime-reporting has been studied by Soares (2004a, b) and DiTella et al. (2010) in a different context. about households' experiences with crime, including reporting to the police, for thousands of respondents in 78 countries. The ICVS contains a number of questions concerning the reporting of crime, which enables us to assess the robustness of our WJP findings on reporting using different data. In addition, for a few questions, the ICVS asks the respondents the reasons for reporting or not reporting the incidents of crime and corruption. We also use the Corruption
Barometer from Transparency International to examine the incidence of corruption in a number of countries, whether it is reported, as well as the reasons for reporting or not reporting.
Our main findings can be easily summarized. First, we find empirical support for the proposition that, within countries, the more educated people complain more, both about government misconduct when it occurs and crime in general. This relationship is particularly strong in developing countries, consistent with the view that, in developed countries, even the less educated have the knowledge and lack of fear to complain. Second, the country-average assessment that a policeman violating the law will be punished is a strong predictor of the probability of complaining about misconduct and reporting crime. Third, the results are particularly strong in autocracies, suggesting that voting might not be the only important exercise of voice in the political process. Fourth, the analysis of additional data sets confirms our main findings. Fifth, educated countries have a lower incidence of public and private misconduct.
Overall, the evidence is consistent with the view that complaints influence accountability.
In our regressions, education may proxy for something else, such as income, trust, social status, or even gender. For example, richer people might be able to hire lawyers, or even to find time, to make their complaints more effective (on the other hand, their time is more valuable, so they might not bother). Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) show empirically, however, that education is more important than income as a determinant of political participation. One can likewise argue that trust in institutions is correlated with education, and that trust rather than education drives complaints. It could also be that socio-economic status or gender drives the confidence in the success of a complaint, and hence the likelihood that it is made.
We examine all these alternatives empirically. The evidence shows that few of these factors influence the likelihood of complaining, and none eliminate the large impact of education on complaints. While it is still possible that education is correlated with a relevant omitted individual-specific variable, such as personal drive or ambition, there is some reason to believe that education is indeed an important determinant in individuals' decisions to report government misconduct. Our analysis is of course based on cross-sectional data and as such does not prove causation. It nonetheless identifies an interesting relationship that deserves further exploration.
The empirical analysis raises a number of questions of interpretation. First, why are the more educated more likely to complain? There are at least three possibilities. First, educated people might merely know better how to complain effectively: they are more literate, more articulate, and more knowledgeable about where to go and how to complain. This is a pure human capital channel: complaining is like any other activity for which productivity rises with education. Verba and Nie (1972) , Verba, Scholzman, and Berry (1995), and Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Berry (1996) take this point of view with respect to political participation. A second channel is that educated people are more pro-social, share common values, and are less tolerant of injustice (Dewey 1944 , Hayek 1960 , Putnam 1993 , Campbell 2006 , Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007 , Algan et al. 2013 . Because better educated people are better socialized, they are more willing to complain against public misconduct even when the odds of private success are low. A third channel, intimately related to the first, sees educated people as less fearful of official reprisals. This might be in part because they know the law and the rules, and hence can stand up to officials, but it might also be because they are themselves "legal" -work formally, occupy their residence formally -and hence do not feel at risk. We explore some of these possibilities empirically, and find that fear of police reprisals and the lack of knowledge of how to complain seem to be important factors behind silence.
In the next section, we describe our data. Section III presents the basic findings from the WJP database. Section IV examines other data sources. Section V concludes. Our findings are broadly consistent with the hypothesis that, via the complaint mechanism, education promotes government accountability and ultimately the quality of institutions.
II. Data
The arguments outlined above yield three main hypotheses: (1) educated people are more likely to complain, within a country; (2) a higher expected probability of success in a country encourages complaints; and (3) more educated countries have a lower incidence of public misconduct, in equilibrium. We bring these hypotheses to the data using individual-level data on citizen complaints and reporting from the general population polls of the World Justice Project (Agrast et al. 2012) . Over the last three years, the WJP has conducted extensive surveys in 97 countries of the perceptions and experiences of ordinary people concerning their dealings with the government, the police, and the courts; the extent of corruption; as well as the magnitude of common crimes to which the general public is exposed. These surveys were carried out in three waves in 2009, 2011, and 2012 on probability samples of 1,000 respondents drawn from the three largest cities in each country, and were conducted by professional polling organizations using face-to-face, telephone, and online interviews. Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables from the WJP and the supplementary sources used in the analysis and Appendix B displays the summary statistics for our main variables. As the Appendix B shows, there is a fair amount of variation in the level of education and the probability of complaining among countries. For instance, the fraction of college graduates in the three largest cities covered in our data ranges from 4% in Sri Lanka to 71% in Russia, while the proportion of people who submitted a complaint against a government agency goes from 2% in Georgia to 38% in Ethiopia.
III. Evidence

Basic Findings
To begin, we focus on the relationship between education and the reporting of government misconduct or crime at the individual level. Our basic specification includes two indicator variables for whether the respondent is a college graduate or a high school graduate, respectively, and country fixed-effects to control for potential country-specific omitted variables.
The dependent variables are dummies equal to zero or one depending on whether a particular event occurred. Unless otherwise noted, all the results are estimated using OLS with country fixed effects, and standard errors clustered at the country level so as to account for dependence among observations within each country. This specification allows us to examine most simply the extent to which respondents' reporting behavior is related to their education, other observable characteristics, as well as their country's institutional environment. Table 2 contains results for 7 questions from the WJP database. Four of these questions were administered in 88 countries, for a total of about 87,000 observations. 4 The remaining questions were asked in only 63 countries. The first three questions deal with reporting government misconduct; the last four questions deal with reporting crime. For each individual in the survey, we have data on whether he or she is a college graduate, a high school graduate, or has less than high school education.
The first question asks whether the respondent submitted a complaint about services provided by any government agency during the past year. Compared to individuals with less than a high school degree, college graduates are 5.1 percentage points more likely to have submitted a complaint (t = 5.19), while high school graduates are 2.8 percentage points more likely to have submitted a complaint (t = 3.08). These are large effects compared to the worldwide complaining mean of 15.6 percent. The second question asks whether the respondent or someone in their household has been unfairly subjected to physical abuse by the police or the military during the last three years. College and high school graduates are less likely to say that they have been abused, but these effects are not statistically significant. The next question asks the 5,005 individuals in the WJP survey who say they have been abused whether they had reported this police abuse. Here we find a sharply higher and statistically significant probability of reporting (compared to the 47 percentage point world mean) among college and high school graduates. Compared to respondents with less than high school education, college graduates are 8.0 percentage points more likely to report abuse, and high school graduates are 3.1 percentage points more likely, although this estimate is not statistically significant. The data on reporting government misconduct from the WJP suggest that education is associated with a sharply higher probability of complaining.
The remaining four questions in Table 2 deal with reporting crime. The more educated are more likely to experience break-ins and armed robberies than the less educated, and are much more likely to report the crime. Relative to the world-wide mean of 61 percent of reporting break-ins, college graduates were 10.2 percentage points more likely to report the crime, and high school graduates 5.2 percentage points were more likely to report the crime than those without a high school degree. Relative to the world-wide mean of 60 percent of reporting armed robberies, college graduates were 8.8 percentage points more likely to report the crime, but high school graduates were no more likely to report than those without a high school degree. The effect of education, particularly college education, on reporting crime is huge. In order to check the robustness of our findings, we revisit our analysis using logistic regressions and obtain almost identical results (available in Appendix C). Taken together, the results in Table 2 are supportive of the central assumption of our theory, namely that education encourages complaints about misconduct.
We investigate next whether a higher expected probability of success in a country encourages people to complain. In Table 3 , we replace country fixed effects with two countrylevel controls (log of GNI per capita and rule of law) and with country-average assessments of the probability that a policeman violating the law will be punished. The last variable ranges from 0 to 1. We have these data for only 56 countries. The data show large effects of the estimated probability of punishment on the likelihood of complaining, with parameter estimates ranging from 0.38 for complaints about government services to 0.9 for reporting police abuse.
These high coefficients might be partially explained by the omission of country fixed effects, so the probability picks up other aspects of the quality of government. For two out of four measures of complaining (about government services and reporting burglary), our measures of education remain statistically significant and of comparable magnitude to their Table 2 values. The assumption that the expectation of success when reporting misconduct encourages individuals to complain also finds support in the WJP data. In the remainder of the empirical analysis, we return to the country fixed effect specifications to make sure we do not contaminate our findings on individual behavior with country-wide factors.
Variation across Countries
An interesting empirical question is whether the results in Table 2 vary by the level of education in a country. For instance, the benefits of college education may be relatively small in educated countries, where people are generally more empowered and know how to act against government misconduct. In contrast, all coefficients of the interaction terms are negative and most are statistically significant, indicating that these findings do not hold for more educated countries. Joint hypothesis tests indicate that, in these countries, there is no effect of education on complaints about government services, reporting of police misconduct, or reporting of assault, although there is a positive and statistically significant effect of college education on reporting burglary incidents. These results are robust to using different specifications (Appendix D) as well as different measures of educational attainment (not reported). The evidence suggests that uneducated people in uneducated countries might indeed not know how to complain, or be fearful of the authorities (see the evidence described below). In educated countries, in contrast, the knowledge of how to address government misconduct is more widespread, and there is less fear of reprisal. As a consequence, the relationship between education and complaints is not nearly as clear cut in educated countries.
One of the key motivating facts for our paper is that the quality of government improves with education in both democracies and autocracies. Accordingly, we expect our mechanism to work in both. In Table 5 we present the results including interactions between education variables and autocracy scores. The coefficients on interactions are generally insignificant, indicating that our results hold consistently in both autocracies and democracies for complaining about government services, reporting police abuse, as well as reporting crime. These results are robust to changes in the cut-off points used to define autocracy (Appendix D) and to using a continuous rather than a dummy variable (not reported). The fact that the results hold strongly in autocracies is important. Taken together with the relationships in Figure 2 , this suggests that it might be not only the voting mechanism stressed by Hirschman and Verba, but also the decentralized process of individuals complaining against government misconduct, that serves to discipline government officials and improve accountability as countries develop.
Is Education a Proxy for Something Else?
An important question about our finding is whether education is a proxy for something else that may encourage complaining. The leading possibilities are 1) trust or social capital, 2) income, 3) social status, and 4) gender. More trusting people may be better educated but also have greater confidence that their complaints will be addressed fairly. Richer people may be better educated but also have greater resources to complain and perhaps greater sums to complain about. Individuals of higher socio-economic status may be better educated but also feel more empowered to complain. Men may be better educated and also more aggressive or optimistic about success if they complain. Fortunately, the WJP data contain some information on each of these matters, so the concerns can be addressed empirically. Several of the respondent-level questions asked in the WJP survey concern the level of trust in institutions, and we aggregate them into a trust index. We also have for each individual a measure of trust in others. Although the WJP data do not contain information about the exact income of the respondents, it has information on the quintile of the income distribution into which the respondent falls. 5 The WJP data set also contains a series of questions related to social status, including 22 questions on whether the respondent has a certain asset, service, or utility service (for example a car, a cell phone, a credit card, etc.) and a self-assessment of his socioeconomic status. These questions, however, are only available in the 2011 and 2012 waves of data. Finally, the WJP data contain information about the gender of the respondent.
We have run a large number of specifications checking whether the inclusion of these additional controls changes our results on education. Table 6 presents the results of our base specification with trust in public institutions, gender, and four indicator variables for whether the income of the respondent is in the second, third, fourth, or highest quintile of the country's income distribution all included in the regression. 6 The results in Table 6 do not offer much evidence that trust, income, or social status matter for complaining, while education coefficients remain both sizable and statistically significant (except for reporting police abuse). These results hold across a range of specifications, including some with a full set of indicator variables for the income group of respondents interacted with the country fixed effect (Appendix E). Education is not merely a proxy for trust, income, or social status in these data.
There is some evidence that men are more likely than women to complain about government services, but not to report police abuse, burglary, or assault (although they are more likely to report having been victims). We have also checked the effect of including selfassessments of the socio-economic status of respondents -alone and interacted with the country fixed effects -in place of their income group (Appendix F and G). 7 The effects of education remain large and significant. We obtain similar results when we use indicator variables for whether respondents have a certain asset or utility service (Appendix H) or when we use individuals' levels of trust in others instead of trust in public institutions (Appendix I). Finally, we have checked whether religion influences the probability of complaining, and found no evidence that it does.
Another concern is that the propensity to complain is shaped by access to the complaint technology, such as a cell phone or a computer, rather than by education per se. As reported in Appendix H indeed, having a cell phone sharply raises the probability of reporting police abuse and burglary, though not of complaining about government generally. At the same time, having a cell phone does not have much of an effect on education coefficients (There is also no evidence of complementarities between education and cell phone ownership.) We do not find that having a computer affects the probability of complaining or reporting a crime. The evidence suggests that cell phones do indeed facilitate police abuse reporting and crime reporting, but education is by no means a proxy for having a cell phone.
One final concern to mention is the possibility of a survey response bias because uneducated people might worry about survey administrators being connected with police, and therefore might not admit that they reported police abuse. However, this concern applies only to police, and not to general complaining about government services. The fact that we have consistent results across types of complaints undermines this concern. Moreover, the WJP has a 97% response rate to these questions, suggesting that respondents are not afraid. We cannot fully discount this concern, but we doubt that it fully explains our fairly consistent results.
The bottom line of the robustness section is that education does not seem to be a proxy for income, trust, socio-economic status, gender, or access to reporting technology. Education matters a great deal more than other determinants of complaints, and their inclusion in the regression does not substantially influence the impact of the education variables.
IV. Other Data Sources
We next examine the robustness of our results in other data sources, and probe the reasons for reporting or not reporting government misconduct and crime. In Table 7 , we use the ICVS data on crime, which contain information on crime victimization, bribing, and reporting to the police, and have been used by several authors including Soares (2004a, b) , Van Dijk (2007) and Mocan (2008) . We focus on the latest available survey for each country. Table 7 reports, for a sample of 125,000 observations from 71 countries, that the incidence of reporting burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, consumer fraud, and theft was sharply higher for better educated individuals. Across specifications, the results confirm the findings in the WJP data. are not more likely to report the request for a bribe to the police, but are more likely to report it to a public or private agency. In explaining the reasons for not reporting, educated people are less likely to report that the matter was inappropriate for police, but are also less likely to worry that the police will not do anything or to fear/dislike police. There is evidence here that the less educated are more concerned with police reprisals and hence fail to use their voice. In the second panel of Table 8 , we examine affirmative reasons in ICVS for reporting corruption, but do not find any interesting and statistically significant effects. to a combination of the pure human capital story whereby the more educated know how to complain, and a related story that these people do not fear the police. The Corruption Barometer evidence is broadly consistent with our basic theory.
Yiqing Xu (2012) re-examines our hypotheses using the data set of complaints against provincial and local government officials in China, using the China Public Governance Survey.
He also finds that in the Chinese data, better educated citizens are more likely to complain about both government misconduct and public services. Xu finds even larger effects of education than we do. He also finds that the reasons for higher complaints by the better educated include greater knowledge, greater civicness, and lower fear of reprisals. Xu's evidence strongly reinforces our hypothesis that the complaint mechanism of institutional improvement is of particular importance in non-democratic countries.
As a final step, we check whether higher education countries have lower rates of victimization of citizens by criminals and government officials. Figure 3 summarizes these findings, and confirms this basic aggregate prediction of the theory, namely that higher education countries have lower crime and better government performance. This particular prediction, of course is not new: it is the within-country mechanism that represents this paper's innovation.
V. Conclusion
We have proposed a new explanation of the universal positive association between a country's educational level and the quality of its government, namely citizen complaints. We argued that educated citizens complain more, and that these complaints lead to better conduct by officials fearful of being punished, which in turn leads to greater accountability and a higher quality government. One attractive feature of this mechanism is that it is entirely decentralized, and does not rely on any particular institution, such as democracy.
The evidence from a newly collected data for 88 countries from the World Justice Project, and from two additional sources, shows that within countries better educated citizens are indeed more likely to complain about both crime and government misconduct, such as corruption and police abuse. We showed that the association between complaining and education is robust to the inclusion of other individual characteristics such as trust, socio-economic status, or gender.
We also showed that country-average assessment of the probability that an official violating the law will be punished also influences the likelihood of complaints. Although our cross-sectional evidence cannot establish causality, it points tentatively to human capital operating through complaints as an operative mechanism of accountability and institutional improvement. 
Education
The expected number of years of schooling, or school life expectancy (SLE). It is defined as the total number of years of schooling which a child can expect to receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to the current enrolment ratio at that age. It is a synthetic summary indicator of the overall pattern of enrolment ratios at one particular point in time, and has no predictive value except in so far as it is believed that enrolment patterns will remain unchanged into the future. Source: http://unstats.un.org
The score of the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index in 2010. The index provides a measure of the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist in the public and political sectors. The index focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. The index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). Source: www.transparency.org.
World Bank Governance Indicators
The Democracy An indicator variable coded 1 if the polity2 score from the 2011 Polity IV data set is below 0. The polity2 score is computed by subtracting a county's autocracy score from its democracy score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4 Autocracy An indicator variable coded 1 if the polity2 score from the 2011 Polity IV data set is equal or larger than 0. The polity2 score is computed by subtracting a county's autocracy score from its democracy score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Source: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4 Educated An indicator variable coded 1 if the expected number of years of schooling, or school life expectancy (SLE) in the country is greater than 14 years Source: http://unstats.un.org Log GNI per capita Log GNI per capita is the natural logarithm of the GNI per capita (formerly GNP per capita) for the year 2011. The GNI per capita is the gross national income, converted to U.S. dollars using the World Bank Atlas method, divided by the midyear population. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/datacatalog/world-development-indicators 
